Change blindness refers to the inability to detect visual changes that are often accompanied by saccades, eye blinks, or brief flickers or blanks between visual images (for review, see Simons and Rensink 2005) . Visual changes can be incredibly large and still go unnoticed. When brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, even the appearance or disappearance of an airplane jet engine often escapes the observer's awareness (Rensink et al 1997) .
scenes) were adopted from the High-level Vision Database (http://www.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ AandC/HLV/S-archive), which none of the observers had previously seen. The airplane stimuli were presented in the 3rd, 6th, 9th, and 12th trials. No information regarding the stimuli or the search strategy was provided.
The detection accuracy (mean 76.7%), detection time (27.8 s), saccade frequency (2.4 times s À1 ) and saccade amplitude (3.18), and fixation duration (385 ms) of single eye movement did not differ between the airplane and the other stimuli, and also between the experienced and naive observers (two-way, observer6stimulus, mixed ANOVA; p 4 0X05 for all main effects and interaction). These results indicate that mere prior experience of a task does not provide any general advantage in change detection (eg Rensink 2000) .
For the airplane stimuli, however, the experienced observers generally looked at the (supposed) engine's location first, then at the locations that had changed in the previous airplane stimuli, and, finally, they began to search for a change. A three-way (3) 2nd (6) 3rd (9) 4th ( mixed ANOVA (observer6location6presentation number) on the total fixation duration indicated that the interaction between location and presentation number was significant (F 9 72 2X65, p 5 0X05), suggesting that both experienced and naive observers tended to look at the changed locations in the previous modified airplane stimuli (figure 1b). In addition, the experienced observers clearly looked longer at the location of`imaginary engine' in all airplane trials ( figure 1c) . A two-way mixed ANOVA (observer6stimulus: new versus airplane) indicated that the main effect of stimulus (F 1 8 30X3, p 5 0X001) and the interaction (F 1 8 9X37, p 5 0X05) were significant, confirming that the preference for the`imaginary engine' existed only for the experienced observers. Furthermore, this tendency persisted throughout the repeated presentations of the airplane stimuli. A two-way mixed ANOVA (observer6presentation number) indicated that the main effect of observer was significant (F 1 8 5X79, p 5 0X05), whereas the main effect of presentation number (F 3 24 0X99) and the interaction (F 3 24 0X31) were not ( p 4 0X42). The analyses of fixation frequency also showed the experienced observers' preference for thè imaginary engine' and its persistence (not shown). In an additional experiment, this pattern of results was replicated with modified airplane stimuli, wherein the engine was present and did not disappear. In post-experiment interviews, all the observers reported that they immediately noticed that the engine was not present and would not appear. Nevertheless, the experienced observers still looked at the engine throughout the airplane trials as if persisting in the validity of their belief. Experience forms expectation. Eye movements often reflect an expectation for events (Yarbus 1967) . When individuals view novel or familiar scenes, eye movements differ depending on the past viewing history of each scene (Ryan et al 2000; Smith et al 2006) . During visual search, observers almost certainly use contextual information acquired in previous experience (Torralba et al 2006) and top^down influences based on contextual information often prevail over bottom-up processes (eg Triesch et al 2003; Stirk and Underwood 2007) . Such top^down influences are useful only when the contextual information, expectation, and target location are consistent. Therefore, once observers notice that the contextual information does not predict the change location, they should search other locations and even avoid looking at fruitless locations (here, the engine). On the contrary, however, the present results demonstrate the powerful effect of prior experience on eye movements even when the observers are aware of the futility of doing so.
It remains to be investigated what determines the magnitude of the persisting effect of prior experience. One interesting possibility is that the magnitude of the effect is a function of the subjective or objective strength of detection experience (`Bayesian surprise'öItti and Baldi 2006). If so, the effect might be much larger and more persistent in a change-detection task, particularly for observers who had more trouble in finding a change in previous experience. 
